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I 
 
Critical theory: European trajectories 
 
In this chapter we trace the tradition of Critical Theory in Europe in the way it has 
informed and framed legal thought. A key, and distinctive, element of this legal tradition 
is that it characteristically connects to the State as constitutive reference; in other words it 
understands the institution of law as that which organises and mediates the relation of the 
state to civil society. The other constitutive reference is political economy, a reference 
that typically grounds this tradition of thinking about the law in the materiality of the 
practices of social production and reproduction. It is in these connections, of the 
institution of law to the domains of the state and of the political economy, that critical 
legal theory locates the function of law, and the emancipatory potentially it affords on the 
one hand, and the obstacles to emancipation it imposes, on the other. 
  
Given the centrality of the State, as form of political organisation and integration, in the 
next section (II) we take Hegel – as pioneering theorist of the dialectic relation between 
state and civil society – as the historical point of departure of the tradition of critical 
theory in general and of critical legal theory in particular. It is to Hegel that one may 
usefully trace back the variety of trajectories of European critical legal thought, and relate 
to him the wide range of its instantiations, with special emphasis on their reciprocal 
influences, overlaps and differences. 
 
The approach we take in this chapter is thematic, and it is against the background of the 
Hegelian/Marxist legacy that we visit and relate a number of theorists who have 
contributed most decisively to the European tradition of critical theory. While not all 
were centrally concerned with the institution of law, important insights can be drawn 
from them in the direction of critical legal theory.  We will look at the work of the 
important Hegelian Marxist Georg Lukács. We will visit the tradition of critical theory of 
the Frankfurt School, first as it emerges from the legal theory of the Weimar Republic 
when the Institute for Social research was set up in Frankfurt and brought within its ambit 
important thinkers like Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse, Walter Benjamin, Otto 
Kirscheimer, Franz Neumann, and others, under the directorship of Theodor Adorno and 
Max Horkheimer. Amongst the legal scholars here what became distinctive is the way 
that they conceptualised the integration of State and civil society; notable here was 
Neumann’s distinctive take on state theory, as well as Hugo Sinzheimer’s Left-wing 
economic constitutionalism. After the war, some of the protagonists returned from exile 
to the Institute, and their thinking took a ‘negative’ turn away from the notion that the 
dialectic might deliver emancipation. Adorno, would - after Auschwitz - largely 
surrender political critique to the ‘aesthetic turn’, while for Horkheimer the 
collaboration of men in society will be left contradiction-laden ‘with all its waste of 
work-power and human life, and with its wars and its senseless wretchedness’1, unless 
social actors act on the deficit that is experienced by them as alienation, a prospect 
increasingly remote in the face of the instrumental logic of bourgeois constitutionalism. 
The ‘communicative turn’ of the later generation of the Frankfurt school, around the key 
figure of Jürgen Habermas will redirect critical theory to politics in the form of 
communicative reason though, in the process, giving up the tradition’s Marxist legacy 
and arguably divesting it of much of its radicalism to reconcile it, eventually, to law in 
the form of the ‘co-originality’ of democracy and rights, and public and private 
autonomy. 
Running alongside the trajectory of critical theory in Germany, there emerges out 
of the École Normale Superieure in Paris, and around the leading figure of Louis 
Althusser, a Marxist (and Marxian) current of critical thought. Of particular importance 
here is the largely forgotten work of Nicos Poulantzas, the writings of Étienne Balibar 
and Alain Badiou, and the recently much celebrated work of Jacques Rancière.  The 
work of Foucault at the ENS develops largely in dialogue with that tradition. 
A parallel strand of critical legal theory, drawing in part from Gramsci’s theory of 
hegemony, finds expression in the theorists of the ‘material Constitution’ of the Italian 
Left. The emphasis here is on the production of political unity as the latter proceeds 
through processes of ‘condensation’ and ‘distension’ of social forces and the mobilisation 
of collective subjects which provide the ‘efficient cause’ of the development of the 
material constitution, as developed in the work of the leftists of the Operaismo and 
Autonomia movements that emerged out of the syndicalist movement, key amongst 
whom was Antonio Negri. Negri’s materialist understanding of the constitution drove 
him to focus on movement, rather than origins, constitutional development, for Negri, the 
result of continuous formation and re-formation of the composition of social forces, as 
dictated, in other words, by class struggles which are to be understood first and foremost 
as occurring over and around processes of forging the collective subjectivity of the 
revolutionary class. 
 
A comprehensive picture of the spectrum of the strands of critical legal theory must 
include also the somewhat sui generis strand of its development in Britain. Key to 
understanding its particular trajectory is an emphasis on both its Marxist beginnings, its 
decisive break with Marxist thinking in the 1980s, and its subsequent ‘turns’ – ‘ethical’, 
‘aesthetic’ and ‘political’ – of the last few decades, its alignments (and misalignments) 
with feminism and critical race theory, all traceable to the ‘peripatetic’ Critical Legal 
Conference that since the 80s has formed its main vehicle and institutional expression.  
                                               
1Max Horkheimer, ‘Traditional and critical theory’, in The Continuum Publishing Company (eds.), 
Critical theory: Selected essays (1976), 204 ff. 
 Like its continental-European counterpart, the ‘Britcrits’2 emerge as a distinct 
radicalised academic tradition in the mid-seventies, initially by drawing selectively on 
Louis Althusser and Eugeny Pashukanis, and with a passing interest in Nicos Poulatzas 
(especially his exchange with Ralph Miliband)3 and Bernard Edelman.4 Althusser’s 
theory of the interpellation of the subject (of law) has had a lasting influence beyond that 
early phase, and his theory of the ‘relative autonomy of law’ allowed the early critical 
theorists to distance themselves from the more reductive (‘economistic’) analyses and to 
focus more decisively on legal ideology.5 An important difference with the US movement 
was the clear emphasis of the British CLC on collective frames of explanation of identity 
and action, against the more individualist US, attributable to the proximity of the former 
to the traditions of political trade unionism in Britain. This period sees also a productive 
alignment with feminist theory.6 Another important affinity (given also the Lacanian turn 
in Althusser’s thought) was with Freudian and Lacanian themes and problématiques, an 
orientation that has run alongside the critical project in Britain ever since. 
 It might be argued that the distinctive voice of the Critical Legal Conference only 
emerges with their postmodern turn7, which coincides with their break from Marxism, 
and the translation into English of certain key works of Foucault and Derrida, in 
particular the latter’s essay ‘Force of Law’.8 ‘The reception of Derrida,’ says Tim 
Murphy, ‘encouraged critique as etymology, as word-play and as symptomatology’;9 and 
while in the US CLS strand the deconstructive turn primarily takes the form of ‘trashing’ 
or ‘deviationist doctrine’, in the British variant, with its reluctant engagement with 
substantive law, it is largely played out as a critique of legal form, and as ‘fractious 
hostility to legal rules.’10 
  
Out of these distinct histories and trajectories, come diverse critical understandings of the 
role of law. What they have in common is an understanding of law as emerging from, or 
overlaying, a contradiction between Capitalism and Democracy that is operative in 
Western democracies under the aegis of constitutionalism. That constitutionalism is 
fraught by paradox (between constituent and constituted power)11 is a clear indication of 
                                               
2Tim Murphy, ‘BritCrits: Subversion and submission, past, present and future’, (1999) 10.3 Law 
and Critique, 237 ff. 
3 See the useful Elizabeth Nash and William Rich, ‘The specificity of the political: the Poulantzas-
Miliband debate’, (1975) 4.1 Economy and Society, 87 ff.; and Nicos Poulantzas, State, Power, 
Socialism (1978), transl. Patrick Camiller, 110 ff. 
4 Bernard Edelman, Ownership of the Image: Elements of a marxist theory of law (1980). 
5 See in particular Paul H. Hirst, On law and ideology (1979); Barry Hindess and Paul Q. Hirst, 
Pre-capitalist modes of production, Vol. 2 (1975); John Holloway & Sol Picciotto, State and 
capital: a Marxist debate (1979). 
6 See in particular Annette Kuhn and AnnMarie Wolpe. Feminism and materialism: Women and 
modes of production, Vol. 7 (2012).  
7 See Ronnie Warrington, Costas Douzinas with Shaun McVeigh, Postmodern jurisprudence: the 
law of text in texts of law (1991). 
8 Jacques Derrida, Force of law: The'mystical foundation of authority' (2002). 
9 Murphy (n. 2) 255 ff. 
10 Peter Goodrich, ‘The critic’s love of the law: Intimate observations on an insular jurisdiction’, 
(1999) 10.3 Law and Critique, 345 ff. Goodrich characterises it as a ‘critique of law that is to all 
appearances steadfastly indifferent to substantive law and does not engage with doctrine.’ 349 ff. 
11 See Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker, The paradox of constitutionalism: constituent power 
and constitutional form (2007). 
the depth of the contradiction, which also finds expression, inter alia, in the difficulty of 
navigating the boundary between public and private law, in other words of reconciling 
the notion of a collective common good and the pursuit of private interests and fortunes 
under capitalist conditions.  The tensions are recurrent and ineradicable, and it is here that 
questions that animate critical legal theory take shape. The tensions relate to the 
contradictory elements of modern Western and/or Westernised societies, be this in the 
form of the constitutional state as both organiser of oppression (the Capitalist State) and 
of solidarity (the Social State), those that abound between capitalist proprietary interests, 
on the one hand, and social rights, on the other, as well as those that arise from different 
modes of government, notably technocracy (with its emphasis on economic expertise and 
“output” legitimacy) on the one hand, and popular sovereignty (with its emphasis on 
democratic self-government and “input” legitimacy), on the other.  
 
The responses of critical legal theory to these tensions range widely: i) from radical 
Marxian strategies of ‘immanent critique’ and the critique of liberal rights and bourgeois 
parliamentarism from the point of view of industrial democracy; ii) to the various forms 
of accommodation articulated in the ‘communicative turn’ of the current phase of the 
Frankfurt School (Habermas, Wellmer, Honneth, etc); iii) to the development of a post-
modern form of critical thinking initially connected to the work of Lyotard, then Derrida, 
and then taken up by the US ‘Crits’; iv) to the articulation of forms of post-State critical 
thought in the forms of ‘constitutionalism from below’ associated with the global South; 
iv) to the forms of critical thinking associated and articulating on a global scale in the 
struggles against ‘Empire’ (as per the influential work of Hardt and Negri); etc. The 
above inventory of current manifestations is only indicative and in any case incidental to 
a volume committed to exploring the interrelation between legal history and 
jurisprudence with its emphasis on historical inquiry. We will contend that it is towards 
the junctures between these different critical theoretical responses that critical historical 
inquiry will elucidate with new insights that may come to inform and revitalise the 
tradition of critical legal thought and theory, attentive to its self-understanding as 
intervention, and conscious of the ineradicably political dimension of its undertaking. 
 
 
 
II 
 
The State and the Critique of Domination: Hegel’s legacy 
 
History is the dissimilating journey of the Absolute through time, and this journey arrives 
at its destination with the consolidation of modern statehood, contended Hegel.12 The 
journey is “dissimulating” because of the way it presents the Absolute as a series of 
finitudes and partial truths. However, throughout this journey, the Absolute remains the 
Absolute, and finitude is not to be considered its facade, but its reality, for the word 
                                               
12  Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Philosophie der Geschichte, in Hegel, Werke in zwanzig 
Bänden 12 (1970), 57 ff.: “Der Staat ist die göttliche Idee, wie sie auf Erden vorhanden ist”; 
Philosophie des Rechts, in Hegel, Werke 7 (1970), 398 ff. (par 257): “Der Staat ist die Wirklichkeit 
der sittlichen Idee.” 
“façade” does not belong to the vocabulary of the Absolute.13 The task of philosophy, 
Hegel thought, is to comprehend the relation between the eternal reality of the Absolute 
and its dissimulation in time as a series of finitudes. 
 
The history of critique – be it philosophical or social – is a history of refusals to give up 
this Hegelian ‘mythologeme’. This is true also of Marxian critiques (critiques that insist 
on ‘turning it on its head.’)  For if critique forever tracks a distorted relation between the 
Absolute and its finite appearance, no critique would be possible if its language would 
not sustain a relation – however strained – between what is and what ought to be. 
Critique that would sever what ought to be completely from what is would not command 
the comprehension it requires to figure as critique. The incomprehensibility or 
incomprehension is the flaw, Hegel insisted, that renders Kant’s conception of critique 
pointless. For him Kant’s categorical severance of what is (Sein) from what ought to be 
(Sollen), terminates meaningful assessment. The incurable hermeneutic deficit – the 
incorrigible incomprehension – that looms large here is evident. What can duty 
(Pflicht/Sollen) mean for us if it bears no plausible link with any response to finite 
circumstances? It should be evident that the notion of critique simply evaporates when no 
instance of concrete existence can meaningfully bear the burden of an imperative. The 
Marxian notion of immanent critique pivots on this key insight that emerged from 
Hegel’s critique of Kant. 
 
Our concern with the history of critique keeps the Hegelian mythologeme in place, and 
retains the emphasis on its centrepiece, the modern state. It traces a number of its key 
mutations in the course of the twentieth century and it reflects on what it might mean for 
critique to give up on Hegel’s magnificent ruse.  
 
 
The Significance of the State in the History of Critique 
 
Critique, as we know it, always occurs in the context of, and takes its opportunity from, a 
long history of theological, ontological and sociological divisions. Engagement with this 
history begins with the faltering of the ‘Eusebian myth’ that considered the Roman 
Emperor as the incarnation of divine providence. This myth was written all over the 
simultaneous association (quod principi placuit legis vigorem habet) and dissociation 
(princeps legibus solutus est) of law and the will of the Emperor in Roman law,14 a 
division of power repeated in the separation of power into the elements of potestas and 
auctoritas during the time of the Roman Republic.15 These two maxims – both authored 
by the Ulpian – reflect an early attempt to sustain some kind of division between the 
finite and infinite within the organization of power and law. One might go further and 
                                               
13 Hegel rejected Platonist and Kantian conceptions of the phenomenal world as “mere 
appearance,” that is, as a mere façade behind which the essence of things remained hidden. 
Appearance - Erscheinung – is for him the manifestation of essence. See the whole “second 
section” on Erscheinung, Wissenschaft der Logik II, in Hegel, Werke 6 (1969), which is 
encapsulated in the phrase “essence must appear” - “[das] Wesen muss erscheinen” 124 ff. 
14 Joseph Canning, A History of Medieval Political Thought (2014) I, 300–1450 ff. 
15 For an instructive discussion, see Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, transl. Kevin Attell, 
(2005). 
conceive the Eusebian myth as emerging in the Roman legal imagination in order to host 
a series of new myths regarding the division of finite and infinite power, the first of 
which was the doctrine of the Two Swords through which the medieval Christian 
imagination sought to settle a long history of battles between Emperor and Clergy (or 
later, King and Clergy) for a single overarching title that would comprise both finite 
power and infinite authority.16  
 
Not many centuries passed before a critical imagination wedged into the body of the King 
so as to split it into two, thereby producing the symbolism of the King’s two bodies, his 
terrestrial body, on the one hand, and his celestial body, on the other.17 But splitting or 
doubling the King’s body was as good as knifing him. The myth of divine royalty was 
evidently approaching total exhaustion by the time half of the King – the crucial half 
representing the infinite continuation of his reign (“the King is dead, long live the King”) 
– was all too evidently nothing but an effigy. The modern state was on its way and it soon 
either just got rid of the King, or reduced him to a cultural relic (a living effigy) that all 
too evidently no longer commanded any force that was remotely worthy of a dialectic 
between the finite and the infinite. The time of the myth of transcendence was over. The 
modern state had no option but to internalize this dialectic and this internalization became 
the birth scene of the social critiques associated with the Modernity, and with Hegel and 
Marx in particular. 
 
 
Hegel and the Internalisation of Critique in the Context of the Modern State  
 
The key feature of the modern state remains its concern with a constitutive division or 
split. Niklas Luhmann writes:  
 
The necessity to provide foundations – of which the profound rootedness in the 
division between thought and existence cannot be discussed here – splits social 
reality with cleaving force into a sphere of the state and a sphere of society. The 
state has to justify itself to and in society. (Hegel’s conception, which takes over 
this principle of division but inverses the foundational relation, never received a 
real following).18 
 
                                               
16 The doctrine of the Two Swords gave way in turn to a late Medieval restatement of the Eusebian 
conviction of the unity of divine and secular power. This restatement of the Eusebian myth 
emerged with the doctrine of the Divine Right of Kings, which once again endowed the King with 
both secular power and religious authority. Once more the finite and the infinite appeared 
reconciled in the corridors of earthly government, but this reconciliation was also not to last long. 
See John Neville Figgis, The Theory of the Divine Right of Kings (1922). 
17  Ernst Kantorowicz, The king's two bodies: A study in medieval political theology (1957). 
18  Niklas Luhmann, Grundrechte als Institution (1965), 27 ff.  
“[Es ist] die Notwendigkeit der Begründung, deren tiefe Wurzeln in der Scheidung von Sein und 
Denken hier nicht freigelegt werdern können, die mit bohrender Kraft die soziale Wirklichkeit 
aufspaltet in eine Sphäre des Staates und eine Sphäre der Gesellschaft. Der Staat hat sich in der 
Gesellschaft und and der Gesellschaft zu rechtfertigen. (Die Auffassung Hegels, die das 
Trennschema übernimmt, aber das Begründungsverhältnis umkehrt, blieb ohne reale Folgen.)” 
Our concern with this key passage from Luhmann’s early work does not only pertain to 
his acute reservation regarding “the cleaving force” (bohrende Kraft) through which the 
modern state founds itself by means of a division between civil society and the state 
(proper), but also and especially to the throwaway parenthesized sentence with which it 
ends: “Hegel’s conception, which takes over this principle of division but inverses the 
foundational relation, never received a real following.” To be sure, Luhmann is not 
suggesting here, at odds with overwhelming evidence, that Hegel received no following. 
He is only referring to the fact that Hegel’s invocation of the state as the author and civil 
society as the object of justification never received a following. The history of nineteenth 
century law and politics in Germany (but surely also in the United States and France) was 
certainly one in which the conservative patrimonial interests of a bourgeois civil society 
gained the upper hand in the organization of the state, thereby entrenching the power of 
civil society to demand justification from the state instead of having to justify itself to the 
state. 
 
Hegel’s philosophy of law and the state indeed pivoted on the observation that an 
unleashed civil society will eventually destroy the conditions for individual autonomy on 
which itself was based. Three passages from the Grundlinien des Philosophie des Rechts 
describe civil society dramatically as the monstrous power that ultimately consumes all of 
human existence, impoverishes and excludes the working class from whatever benefits it 
promises, and heaps disproportionate wealth on a small number of individuals: 
 
Civil society is rather the monstrous power which draws men into itself and claims 
from them that they work for it, owe everything to it, and do everything by its 
means.19 
When civil society is in a state of unimpeded activity, it is engaged in expanding 
internally in population and industry. The amassing of wealth is intensified by 
generalising (a) the linkage of men by their needs, and (b) the methods of preparing 
and distributing the means to satisfy these needs, because it is from this double 
process of generalisation that the largest profits are derived. That is one side of the 
picture. The other side is the subdivision and restriction of particular jobs. This 
results in the dependence and distress of the class tied to work of that sort, and 
these again entail inability to feel and enjoy the broader freedoms and especially 
the intellectual benefits of civil society. 20 
When the standard of living of a large mass of people falls below a certain 
subsistence level – a level regulated automatically as the one necessary for a 
member of the society – and when there is a consequent loss of the sense of right 
and wrong, of honesty and the self-respect which makes a man insist on 
maintaining himself by his own work and effort, the result is the creation of a 
rabble of paupers. At the same time this brings with it, at the other end of the social 
                                               
19 Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, in Hegel, Werke 7 (1970), 386 ff. (par 238) in 
English translation of Knox (1821) quoted in the text above is slightly amended. 
20 Hegel (n.19) 389 ff. (par 243). 
scale, conditions which greatly facilitate the concentration of disproportionate 
wealth in a few hands.21 
The proximity of Hegel’s to Marx’s critique of bourgeois society speaks for itself from 
these passages. The difference between them only commences with the opposite paths of 
critique on which they embarked. Marx viewed the state as fundamentally implicated in 
the class struggle and, at least in Engels’ account of it, ultimately little more than an 
instrument with which the bourgeoisie protected its interests, hence also Engels’ 
normative prediction that the state will disappear when the class struggle comes to an 
end. The observation that the 19th century state ultimately became little more than a 
placeholder for bourgeois interests was sociologically correct. Hegel, however, still held 
on to the belief that the state was the only plausible guarantor for the universal moral 
autonomy that Kant’s practical philosophy articulated and which the French Revolution 
sought to make a concrete reality. His thinking still contemplated an early revolutionary 
generation that consider the state as the source of liberty and not a threat to it.22 
 
Nineteenth century private law jurisprudence was a conspicuous pillar among those from 
which Hegel “never received a following,” as Luhmann puts it. One of the most 
celebrated twentieth century historians of private law, Franz Wieacker, would observe 
with regard to nineteenth century private law jurisprudence that the potential of Hegel’s 
philosophy to reconcile concept and history made no impression on German private law 
theory.23 However, it did make an impression on German public law theory. One of the 
most eminent and influential examples in this regard would be the work of Rudolf 
Smend. Smend expressly relied on a Hegelian conception of the dialectic between the 
finite and infinite to articulate a theory of the state as an integrating force that constantly 
articulates or rearticulates itself in history, thereby reconciling its eternal normative core 
with whatever vicissitudes of historical contingency may come to befall it.24  
 
Of course the side of Hegel that was at work in Smend’s thinking, was not the 
revolutionary Hegel who consistently toasted Bastille day as long as he lived25 – the one 
whom Wieacker evidently considered as a critical alternative to the private law 
jurisprudence of the Historical School that ended up serving the Restoration movement – 
but,  a Hegel who could be employed in a conservative cultural restoration movement not 
unlike and quite likely historically related to both the Historical School and the 
                                               
21 Hegel (n.19) 389 ff. (par 244). For an instructive discussion, see Joachim Ritter, ‘Hegel und die 
französische Revolution' in Metaphysik und Politik, (2003), 183–255; ‘Hegel and the French 
Revolution’ (1984). 
22 See Walter Leisner, Grundrechte und Privatrecht (1960), 22 ff. 
23 Franz Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit (1967), Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 415 ff. 
24 As he put it in a key passage: “The constitution is the legal order of the state, more specifically, 
of the life in which the state has its living reality, that is, its process of integration. The meaning of 
this process is the perennial renewal of the living totality of the state and the constitution is the 
statutory articulation of norms with which some aspects of this integration must comply.” Transl. 
from Rudolf Smend, 'Verfassung und Verfassungsrecht', Staatsrechtliche Abhandelungen und 
andere Aufsätze (1994), 189 ff. 
25 See Ritter (n. 21) 196.  
Restoration.26 For the conservative Smend27 the task of cultural historical interpretation, 
that could integrate Germany and the German people, was to be conferred to a judiciary 
that was widely perceived from the side of the socialist and workers movements as partial 
to the old status quo of the German Empire; hence the insistence of these movements that 
courts should have no revisionary powers vis-à-vis the legislation of the new Republic. 
 
This is precisely the message of the progressive constitutional theorists of the time, 
notable among whom were Franz Neumann and Hermann Heller. Both Neumann and 
Heller would place their faith in the parliament, in positive legislation, and positive law. 
They were legal positivists and their positivism was motivated by a concern with social-
democracy that for them evidently outweighed all concerns with German cultural 
identity. (Later, post-Radbruch, generations of “progressive” legal theorists for whom 
legal positivism would become a swearword, conveniently remained ignorant of this 
progressive political motivation of the Weimar positivists.) The Weimar Left knew that a 
conservative judiciary with interpretive powers could easily undo the social-democratic 
revolution in Germany by reading their own cultural values into the general principles of 
the Weimar Constitution. It should be noted that another major constitutional theorist of 
the time, Hans Kelsen, whom later generations – and especially one famous 
contemporary – would deride for his lifeless positivism and normativism, also 
disqualified the judiciary from interpreting the broad principles of the Constitution.28 His 
famous contemporary was Carl Schmitt, the constitutionalist theorist who completely 
unleashed the interpretive powers of judges by turning every clause of law into an open 
clause of law.29 
 
Schmitt’s unleashing of judicial powers of interpretation in 1933 – for purposes of 
making sure that the fundamental tenets of the National Socialist movement permeated 
every aspect of German society – stands in clear contrast to Neumann’s critical 
assessment of the transformation of private law that was taking place at the hands of the 
Weimar judges. The open principles of private law such as “good faith” and “good 
morals” (gute Sitten/boni mores) became general principles private law jurisprudence 
with regard to which even clearly applicable statutory rules of law could be re-assessed 
and re-interpreted by the courts. The liberal application of the general principles of law 
thus became an effective instrument with which democratic legislation could be 
circumvented. In 1933, Julius Hedemann published a small book in which he cautioned 
                                               
26 Smend was an exponent of the cultural-historical integration movement during Weimar 
Germany that considered General Von Hindenburg the personal embodiment of German cultural-
historical identity and therefore the only political force that could integrate Germany and the 
German people. Moreover, Smend also conferred the task of cultural historical interpretation, 
through which the state was to perform to its task of integrated German society, to a judiciary that 
was widely perceived from the side of the social and workers’ movements as partial to the old 
status quo of the German Empire; hence the insistence of these movements that courts should 
have no revisionary powers vis-à-vis the legislation of the new Republic. 
27 See Smend (n.24) 145 ff. See also Peter C. Caldwell, ‘Is a ‘Social Rechtsstaat’ Possible? The 
Weimar Roots of a Bonn Controversy’ in Caldwell and Scheuermann (eds.), From Liberal 
Democracy to Fascism: Legal and Political Thought in the Weimar Republic (2000), 143 ff. 
28 Hans Kelsen, ‘Wesen und Entwicklung der Staatsgerichtbarkeit’,  in Robert Christian Van 
Ooyen (ed.), Wer soll der Hüter der Verfassung sein? (2008), 39 ff. 
29  Carl Schmitt, Staat, Bewegung, Volk (1933). 
against the general flight into the general clauses of law (Flucht in die 
Generalklauseln).30 And it is to Hedemann that Schmitt responded by arguing that every 
rule of law had become a general clause of Nationalist Socialist rule that judges had to 
employ programmatically to promote the dynamic ideals of the movement.31 Neumann 
described this development in detail in his 1937 essay “Die Funktionwandel des Gesetzes 
im Recht der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft.”32 It began, he shows, with the Weimar 
judiciary’s remarkable appropriation of the power to review parliamentary legislation – 
something that was unheard of in the jurisprudence of the Reichskammergericht and other 
supreme or high courts of Europe since the French Revolution – in view of the demands 
of reasonableness and good faith. The main aim of these newly adopted review powers 
was to counteract the social security and anti-trust legislation of the new social 
democratic republic. And their cumulative effect was to establish an institutional concept 
of law that ultimately reduced the relations between autonomous legal subjects to the 
demands of an imperative communal fidelity (Gemeinschaftstreue) that shielded the 
naked social reality of an authoritarian state serving the concerns of a handful of private 
monopolies. 
 
The Hegelian idea of the state safeguarding its citizens against the monstrous 
consumption of moral autonomy by civil society had evidently collapsed into an 
antithesis from which dialectic escape was no longer a realistic prospect. Far from a 
powerful state with the sovereign power to protect its citizens, the National Socialist state 
was ultimately a weak societal construction that fell prey to the demands of powerful 
private social actors.33 The National Socialist movement itself attached no more than 
expedient importance to the state. It was an incidental form with which the dynamism of 
the movement was prepared to compromise as long as it served its purposes.34 However, 
the lasting legacy of the movement was to cast a lasting shadow over the idea of the state 
as the source of liberty. Later generations that increasingly failed to distinguish between 
the National Socialist movement and state, would accordingly also commence to view the 
state as a threat instead of a source of liberty. This would indeed then also become one of 
the main features of the most significant post-war political developments in Europe, 
namely, the series of treaties that would lead to the formation of the European Union. It is 
not an exaggeration to suggest that distrust of national states was a driving force of this 
development. Neither is it an exaggeration to suggest that this development itself 
contributed much to the further demise of the idea of the state as an emancipatory force. 
And this is how one of the key normative ideals of Modernity unravelled in the course of 
the second half of the twentieth century to the extent that percipient observers of this 
development would invoke in this regard the return of feudalism.35 
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A crucial ambivalence remains in critical theory when it comes to its attitude toward the 
state. As was mentioned already, for the Marxist Left the state remained harnessed to the 
interests of the capitalist class though the precise nature of that alignment was hotly 
debated. Amongst the most insightful approaches and certainly one of the most complex 
was that of Nicos Poulantzas who argued that the state was the ‘material condensation’ of 
the relations of social power as these find contradictory expression within the ambit itself 
of the state, which thus ceases to be a monolithic bloc, as in Engels, but instead harbours 
antagonisms that lend themselves to the strategic action of political actors.36 At the other, 
post-Marxist end of critical theory, Habermas will argue for the continuity between the 
legislative and executive political functions whereby popular sovereignty as exercised 
through the legislative channels of will-formation is transferred to the state for 
implementation so long as the processes are not overly distorted by the logics of money 
and excessive bureaucracy, what Habermas calls ‘the colonisation of the lifeworld’.  
 
Across the varieties of critical theory, then, an undeniable contradiction would continue 
to complicate this increasing marginalisation of the idea of the state as the main 
emancipatory force in modern societal organisation. The state has remained the only 
power with real capacity to coerce. Military and police capabilities have not been 
transferred to other social actors, despite the pervasive trans-nationalisation and 
globalisation of economic, societal, cultural and even governmental arrangements. This 
has lead one prominent observer to contend that state sovereignty still underpins the 
whole movement towards transnational “social constitutions” that marks the world order 
of the late twentieth/early twenty first century.37 The question that beckons in this regard 
concerns the way this contradiction will be resolved or processed in the course of the 
twenty first century. Will sovereign statehood reassert itself as an emancipatory form of 
social organisation, or will it all too evidently become reduced to a useful obfuscation of 
social forces that have no concern with the emancipatory ideals of Modernity?   
 
 
 
III 
 
Critical theory as Ideology-critique 
 
If the return to Hegel, and the Left-Hegelian philosophical tradition, allowed us to 
recover the critical vein of Marxism from the standpoint of its own philosophical 
foundation, and to focus it on the critique of domination (Herrschaftskritik), another takes 
the cue from Hegel in terms of the dialectical method and deploys it in the direction of 
the critique of ideology (Ideologiekritik).  
 
 
Immanent critique 
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For this we turn, with Marx, to the processes of production and social reproduction to 
identify the locus of critique. Basic categories of the operation of the economy and the 
material reproduction of society are expressions of capitalist relations. They are 
constitutively mediated through the basic categories of private law that give them 
expression as acts of freedom and autonomous agency. There are key features of material 
organisation of society that are thereby distorted, misrepresented, eclipsed or elided in the 
process of giving them expression. By tracking, fastening onto, and ‘exploiting’ the 
contradictions that the imaginary constitution of society therefore inevitably incurs, the 
critical method is able to engage actors normatively in forms of contestation of the reality 
of their situation. The critical element appears both at the level of the experience of 
meaning (or sense) and of structure/agency. The first, semiotic, route takes us to the 
processes of meaning construction; the second route leads us to questions of structure and 
agency and the way in which speaking positions – rather than what is spoken about – are 
formed.  
 
There is much to develop at this juncture of meaning-construction and agency, and we 
can begin with the notion of immanent critique to capture the idea of theory as practical, 
engaged activity.  A useful instantiation here is Max Horkheimer’s famous essay 
‘Traditional and Critical theory’ and the way he describes the lived experience of 
meaning-creation, and of its deprivation. The primary transcendental move of critical 
thought, says Horkheimer referring to Kant, refers to the transcendental condition of 
knowledge, must presuppose the existence of its object, and reflects on the a priori that 
conditions its possibility. For the Hegelian that he is, ‘the tension between the concept 
and being is inevitable and ceaseless.’ Critical theory installs itself in the instituting gap 
between the two and articulates them in dialectical terms. What drives the dialectic is not 
some speculative commitment to coherence but, for Horkheimer (who here repeats 
Marx’s insight) to a deficit that is experienced by social actors as alienation. ‘The critical 
theorist,’ he says, ‘finds himself confronted with the real experience of disharmony or 
alienation.’ Much of Horkheimer’s critical enterprise is directed to tracking the 
‘productive’ tension between processes he deems ‘objective’ and the ‘subjective’ 
experience they generate in those who find themselves subjected to them. There arises a 
discrepancy between what law promises – freedom, equality, self-determination – and 
what it delivers. Note how crucial for ‘immanent critique’ is the embeddedness in actual 
experience: it means that the representation of that discrepancy, and contradiction, is not 
merely an expression of historical reality but a force of change within it because it 
attaches to the experience of social actors who are striving to make sense of their 
experience. ‘Immanence’, in other words, always-already implicates the historically 
poised, necessarily unfinished nature of human engagement, which suggests that the 
engagement is not something subjects can stand back from, but one that comes upon 
them with the ‘force of present distress’ which they need to ‘make rational’.38 For critical 
theory the awareness of its own partiality, the rational falling short of the categories of 
thought, is what drives them to transcend current forms of their finitude. A certain 
incomprehensibility of suffering as such calls forth a response by the subject, whether it 
takes the form of de-mystifying the capitalist surface forms of equality, or the critique of 
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domination through culture, or ideology critique. The inaugural gesture of critical thought 
is reflexivity over its own partiality. 
 
 
The Dialectic of Subjectivity 
 
The history and theory of the subject, of agency as engaged in the social world, is central 
to the conceptual development of critique and critical theory that would come to the fore 
in the dialectic thought of Hegel and Marx. We take here take a brief look at two key 
moments of what might be called the Hegelian-Marxian narrative of the dialectic of 
subjectivity, namely, the revitalisation of the dialectic of subjectivity in the thought of 
Georg Lukács and its undoing in the work of Theodor Adorno. They represent key 
moments in the trajectory of European critical thought. 
 
The central concern of Lukács’ epochal revision of Marxist thinking was the 
rehabilitation of the dialectic between subject and object and the reinstating of the 
revolutionary subject. Lukács considered both these elements – the dialectic between 
subject and object and the agency of the revolutionary subject – to have disappeared from 
the late phase of Marx’s work (largely as a result of the influence of the thought of 
Engels). Central to Lukács’ revision of Marxist thinking was the endeavour to replace 
what had become the objective dialectic of categories (later also associated with scientific 
historical materialism) with a revolutionary dialectic in which the proletariat would again 
assume the role of revolutionary subject.39 The revolutionary agency of the proletariat 
that Lukács sought to rehabilitate in Marxist critique consisted, according to him, in 
destroying the false objectivity that resulted from capitalist commodity fetishism and the 
resulting reification of social relations.40 For purpose of this rehabilitation he considered 
it necessary to return to the key concern of subjective agency in Hegel’s dialectic, 
stressing in this regard the important influence of Fichte’s emphasis on the primacy of 
action and praxis on Hegel’s conception of the dialectic.41 
 
The discovery of the revolutionary subject or agent of history in German Idealism 
nevertheless gave way to – as Lukács put it – the mystification of Spirit in Hegel’s 
thought, a mystification that Marx duly demystified by turning the history of Spirit into 
the history of matter and historical Idealism into historical materialism, before historical 
materialism, too, lost its concern with material historical agency in the conceptualism of 
the late Marx. It is this conceptualism that Lukács sought to replace with real historical 
and subjective agency and for purposes of which he turned to the agency of the 
proletariat, only to discover that the proletariat itself is already so implicated in the 
reification of social relations – concerned with its own immediate class interests instead 
of the emancipatory ideal of the classless society – that it no longer offers the promise of 
historical agency without being guided towards its true historical interests. It is for this 
guidance that Lukács turned to the leadership of the Communist Party.42  
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Lukács thus articulated and published in 1923 what may be considered the last major 
aspirational conception of relatively orthodox Marxism to invoke the utopian potential 
embodied in the discontent of the proletariat and the epistemological leadership of the 
Communist Party, before the disaster of the Stalin-Hitler pact derailed this current of 
Marxist thinking for good in 1939, at least as far as Western Marxism is concerned. One 
of the most pertinent responses to this disaster would come from two social theorists of 
the Frankfurt School, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno. Their legacy would be to 
place the very notions of historical subjectivity and the idea of an emancipatory dialectic 
between subject and object in question. Their co-authored essay on The Dialectic of 
Enlightenment (1944) already commenced with an equation of subject-formation and 
reification. The subject itself is as such a product of reification and dominance and can 
therefore not be invoked for purposes of contemplating a revolutionary de-reification of 
social relations, they argued. Adorno would articulate this thought further in a way that 
directly challenged Lukács view of the subject as an agent of emancipation. One can 
consider the following key passage from his Negative Dialectics (1966) one of the crucial 
statements of critical theory’s despairing withdrawal from the philosophy of the subject 
and the whole legacy of German Idealism: 
 
The human mind is both true and a mirage: it is true because nothing is exempt from the dominance which 
has brought it into pure form; it is untrue because, interlocked with dominance, it is anything but the mind 
it believes and claims to be. Enlightenment thus transcends its traditional self-understanding: It is 
demythologization – no longer as a reductio ad hominem, but the other way round, as a reductio hominis, 
an insight into the delusion of the subject that will style itself an absolute. The subject is the late form of the 
myth, and yet the equal of its oldest form.43 
 
It is obvious that the subject considered as the very product and vehicle of dominance can 
no longer be contemplated to enter into an emancipatory dialectic with the object. The 
thing, the object, that figured for Lukács as the product of reification and 
commodification, becomes the abode of a non-identity that critical theory should shield 
against the domination of subjectivity, as another key passage from Negative Dialectics 
makes clear: 
 
If a man looks upon thingness as a radical evil, if he would like to dinamize all entity into pure actuality, he 
tends to be hostile to otherness, … to that nonidentity which would be the deliverance, not of consciousness 
alone, but of reconciled mankind. Absolute dynamics, on the other hand, would be that absolute action 
whose violent satisfaction lies in itself, the action in which nonidentity is abused as a mere occasion.44 
 
The work Negative Dialectics itself is an attempt to resist conceptual grasping of the 
object (the key concern of German Idealism). It considers conceptual thinking as such as 
a suppression of objectivity and endeavours to transcend the concept trough the concept – 
über den Begriff durch den begriff hinauszugelangen45 – by developing a method of 
conceptual constellations that “circled” the object instead of grasping it directly.46 The 
distrust of conceptual thought as irredeemably bound to annihilate nonidentity, 
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nevertheless moved Adorno to shift his concern with a reconciliation between subject and 
object, that would be premised on the nonindentity between them, to art. (Avant-Garde) 
Art, he argued, concerns a mimetic approach to the object that respects nonidentity by 
portraying, exactly, the lack of reconciliation between subject and object.47 With these 
thoughts Adorno took leave of the pursuit of a dialectic reconciliation between subject 
and object that was still central to Lukács’ work. He pursued, instead, a negative dialectic 
that stressed the recognition of non-identity and lack of reconciliation between subject 
and object as the last resort for the promise of a “reconciled mankind.” One might 
contribute the dilemma in which his thinking ended up, in the final analysis, to a failure 
or refusal to let go of the subject-object relation – the essential legacy of German 
Idealism – as the key organisational premise or his thinking, notwithstanding his attempt 
to think this relation negatively. A different line of critique would be opened by a 
thinking that duly began to take leave of this relation, or rather, commenced to 
contemplate a release from it by shifting its focus to the possibility of an event that 
precedes the constellation of subject and object and sets the scene for it. Adorno already 
mentioned – almost in passing – the incidence of artistic intuitions in Negative Dialektik 
that hits the work of the artist like flashes of lightning – ‘[a]uch in die künstlerische 
Arbeit schlagen sie … als Blitze von oben ein.’48 This thought, however, did not detain 
him. It would, however, become the arresting thought in the work of Jean-Francois 
Lyotard, which we will visit briefly later. 
 
 
 From the History of the Subject to the Future of the Event 
 
If the transformation of the critical project can be seen as a move from the dialectic of the 
subject to a focus on the event, it is because the unfolding of subjectivity in history could 
not guarantee that it would resist the reification that ran alongside it with the development 
of Capitalism. This is what the story of the Negative Dialectic tells, and it is also clearly 
expressed in the emphatically anti-Hegelian currents of Marxism associated with the rise 
of structuralist thought.  Amongst the most important here are the theories that emanated 
from the Ecole Normale Superieure in Paris around the key figure of Louis Althusser, 
perhaps the most typical exponent of the anti-Hegelian, structuralist current of Marxism, 
with its emphasis on the structural determination of subject positions and possibilities of 
action without dialectical overcoming. Reading Capital closely, Althusser takes from 
Marx the notion that the fetish phenomenon – the commodity form – on which is based 
capitalist exchange arises as co-original with what may be envisaged as the possibilities 
of human association under capitalist conditions. It cannot be stepped back from, or put 
to question dialectically. In one of his most quoted essays, on the function of ‘ideological 
state apparatuses’, Althusser distinguishes between forms of capitalist state repression 
(police, prison service, military) and ideological forms that operate behind the backs of 
agents, as it were, in calling them forth (‘interpellating’ them is his term) under specific 
descriptions to occupy subject positions that reproduce the relations of production 
according to the logic and the exigencies of capitalism. The subject of these relations is 
not in a position to step behind the ideological forms and put them to question because 
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they inform constitutively what it means to be a ‘free’ subject and what it means to 
exercise those freedoms. The constitutional imaginary of bourgeois democracy cannot be 
put to question by actors who rely on its semiosis of freedom, subjecthood and self-
determination to make sense of their social experience. To contest bourgeois democracy 
was be to transcend those terms, and with them the juridical condition of the construction 
of sense, a condition that revolution alone could deliver. 
 
A similar impasse relating to the subject position is posed by the tradition of 
revolutionary syndicalism in Italy and the post-Gramscian currents of the autonomist 
syndicalist movements. If ‘to speak of constituent power is to speak of democracy,’ as 
Antonio Negri puts it in the opening sentence of his early work on the concept (Il potere 
constituente)  the fact that it appears as constitutional, that is, comes always-already 
implicated with constitutional form, means that democracy is already straitjacketed to the 
conditions and limitations of capitalist legality. To be valid, popular will must be imputed 
to the constitution that establishes the conditions under which the popular will can be 
expressed as sovereign. Law and democracy are reconciled only via the suppression of a 
paradox that impacts on constitution-making as never, inevitably, fully democratic, if 
democracy, ex hypothesi must remain sovereign to contest and determine the conditions 
of its exercise. The tradition of thinking about revolution - a tradition that also informs 
Negri’s  work - in the variety of its instantiations typically returned to the promise of 
constituent power to face up to precisely that reflexive question. ‘What is constituent 
power from the perspective of juridical theory?’ asks Negri, whose priority of course lies 
with constituent power as an expression of the potentiality to break with the logic of 
capitalist reproduction. 
Here is Negri of the earlier work:  
 
[The constituent] is the source of production of constitutional norms – that is, the 
power to make a constitution … in other words the power to establish a new 
juridical arrangement … This is an extremely paradoxical definition: …  Never as 
clearly as in the case of constituent power has juridical theory been caught in the 
game of affirming and denying, absolutising and limiting that is characteristic of its 
logic (as Marx continually affirms.)’49  
 
Negri tracks a sequence of reductions, inflicted by juridical reason in the context of its 
‘taming’ and instrumentalising the constituent, and in the process inflicting ‘every type of 
distortion’     
  
Constituent power must itself be reduced to the norm of the production of 
law; it must be incorporated into the established power. Its expansiveness is 
only shown as an interpretative norm, as a form of control of the State’s 
constitutionality, as an activity of constitutional revision. … In this the 
juridical ‘covers over and alters the nature of constituent power.’ …  ‘This is 
how the juridical theory of constituent power solves the allegedly vicious 
circle of the reality of constituent power. But isn’t closing political power 
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within representation nothing but the negation of the reality of constituent 
power?’50 
 
The ‘interpreters of law’ are at pains to maintain the ‘vitality’ of the system, while 
navigating that vitality away from any kind of dangerous democratic excess.51 Amongst 
the jurists it is only Schmitt, for Negri, that posed the question of constituent power ‘with 
extraordinary intensity.’ (24)  (the ‘constituent’ is preserved in Schmitt in the logic of the 
decision, that is never purely of the order of the ‘constituted’.)  But in tying it to the logic 
of the exception, Schmitt ‘capitulates to the force of an attraction that is by now devoid of 
principles’. (21)  
In the, much celebrated, later work Empire the emphasis has shifted away from 
the state, but the problématique remains, of how to claim a speaking position for the 
subject that breaks with the system of capitalist social reproduction. For Negri, the 
(collective) revolutionary subject, as wielder of constituent power, must remain under-
determined and resist subsumption under the dominant symbolic order. To pick up the 
thread for this incongruent representation, we will need to go back to a certain Italian 
current of Marxism out of which Negri’s work grew: the ‘operaismo’ movement of the 
1960s that formed the springboard for the later ‘autonomist’ current of Italian Marxism in 
the 1970s, in which Negri was a leading figure. What is distinctive about the autonomist 
movement is the centrality within it of a project of working class self-valorisation, and 
with this self-valorisation, crucially, a resistance to accept the hegemonic representational 
orders of Capitalism, a refusal to define the movement through those vocabularies. What 
this entailed was the rather paradoxical refusal to identify the revolutionary-subject-to-
be—the working class—through work, since the system of work, they argued, provides a 
context within which the self-identification of the proletariat as potential revolutionary 
subject is always-already undercut. That is because, to put it in the terms Marx used in 
the Manifesto, ‘a class of labourers, live only so long as they find work, and find work 
only so long as their labour increases capital’. Thus, practically, political action for the 
Autonomia was undertaken in terms of refusal to work, wildcat strikes, spontaneous slow 
downs, acts of sabotage, bad-faith reformism (the political programme of demanding 
more from management than management could possibly deliver, etc.  
At the conceptual level, the possibility for self-identification of the working class 
is cancelled in this undertaking, and Negri can only call upon this ‘project of destruction’ 
to undo the symbolic grip that capitalism exerts on the proletariat with its control—at the 
very point of the recovery of meaning—of the vocabularies and representational orders 
within which self-valorisation might have taken place. The injunction of Operaismo and 
then Autonomia to undertake political praxis ‘dal punto di vista operaio’ becomes 
tragically both urgent and impossible because that point of view forever slips back to 
existing schemata, and makes alternatives visible only in terms of dislocations it marks 
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rather than any consistent programme of ‘self-valorisation’. ‘We find ourselves’, protests 
Negri, ‘with a revolutionary tradition that has pulled the flags of the bourgeoisie out of 
the mud.’52 Like the Marx of The 18th Brumaire, his call is to ‘let the dead bury the 
dead’. And yet, despite its tragic contradiction, for Negri it is of paramount importance to 
remain with the project of self-valorisation.  
It is this project that takes a positive turn in Empire.53 Transferring a distinction 
that Negri borrows from Spinoza between potentia (force) and potestas (authority, 
command). the distinction into politics allows Negri to subordinate the concept of 
sovereignty/potestas to its continuing actualisation in potentia. And potentia becomes the 
term for constituent power. The constituent power of the multitude remains inalienable 
and does not freeze into entrenched representations (‘the people’s autonomy lives before 
its formalisation’, he says). In Insurgencies he wrote of ‘an irresistible provocation to 
imbalance, restlessness and historical rupture’; ceaseless self renewal. In continuity with 
Negri’s earlier work, the main thrust of Empire is a call to resist the familiar (by now) 
problem of representation: that every moment of self-constitution—and the revolutionary 
moment as ultimate self-constitution—must yield to a pre-constituted order. We have 
already discussed the problem that without this yielding, praxis would find no leverage 
and identity no register. The difficulty is that the yielding is at once a necessary 
condition, because without it there is no representational space, and yet cancels out the 
new in the very act of accommodating it in pre-existing schemata. In all this the idea of 
constitutional self-government comes with the ‘self’ over-determined. The collective self 
of this self-government is a self significantly pre-determined in the past, always already 
encumbered with its limitations.   
If the problem is put like this: ‘how can the multitude—the first-person plural—
initiate an action if it is the action itself, its undertaking and acceleration, that positions 
the subject?’ then the answer must be that the subject of constituent power is only ever 
the insurgent subject, the emergent property of an action, not its instigator or agent. 
Could it be then that in linking the two questions and answers together Negri allows 
‘dialectic’ to do more that he initially envisaged? By producing incommunicable 
resistances to its practices as totalising context and target of resistance, ‘Empire’ allows a 
growing coincidence, a certain accumulation of struggles, even an ‘over-determination of 
contradictions’ as Althusser would have it, and in the process of that accumulation the 
emergence of the anti-capitalist movement as universal subject.   
The operation of ‘Empire’ as a system of global capitalism depends on a totalising 
inclusion, whereby all conflict is replicated as crisis. Conflicts are played out as 
fragmentary and local, and thus not only innocuous but actually instrumental to the 
reproduction of Empire. But as production comes increasingly to coincide with 
communication (in that it is ‘communication’ that has displaced all other commodities) 
what guarantee, asks Negri, is it possible for the system to give that this condition (this 
internalisation) will continue? That, in other words, contingencies will not become 
subversive to the system but that they will forever be contained as internal to it, as 
opportunities to instigate responses and in the process re-entrench itself as sole and total 
context, effecting on an unprecedented scale the subsumption of the social to capital? 
There is no meta-guarantee (and ideology can no longer provide the reproduction of 
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meanings at a meta-level) that social production, living labour, desire, and all that 
dynamism will be harnessed to reproduce the given framework of relations and will not 
instead erupt asymmetrically and break with the pressures of homology. And what is 
crucial here is that ‘Empire’ in a sense makes available the space of resistance, suspends 
it open, by the very fact that it has been so spectacularly successful in having effected the 
subsumption of society to capital in the first place.   
 
 
Theorising the Event 
 
What remains to be thought in view of the moments of critique traced above is its 
transformation from a concern with subjectivity to a concern with the event; and more 
specifically, from a concern with subjectivity as irreducibly determined by its history, to 
the event as inception of an undetermined and unprecedented future. For purposes of 
contemplating this transformation, we situate Negri’s concern, above, with an always 
insurgent subjectivity that resists the reduction of constituent to constituted power (and 
the accomplishment of subjectivity that this reduction implies) within the development of 
critical theory from Lukács to Adorno, on the hand, and the emergence of a concern with 
the event in a host of late twentieth century thinkers of whom the work of Alain Badiou 
and Jean-Francois Lyotard can be selected as representative. From the perspective offered 
by the thinking of the event, we shall pose the question whether the insurgent subjectivity 
contemplated by Negri does not, in fact, concern the sheer insurgence of the event that 
predates whatever (restorative) subjectivity may come to be announced in its wake. If this 
question is to be answered positively, one would have to ask whether this turn from a 
concern with the revolutionary subject that is predetermined by its own history to a 
concern with an unprecedented event that inaugurates an as-yet-undetermined future, 
does not also announce an exploration of critique that breaks with the tradition of 
dialectics and seeks to solicit moments of rupture that refuse dialectic incorporation. 
 
Lyotard’s engagement with avant-garde art thematised the anxious concern of the artist 
with the irreducible uncertainty and unpredictability of the event, the irreducible 
uncertainty of whether something will come; the irreducible unpredictability of the there 
is, the il y a.54 His endeavour in Le Différend, in his own words, would be nothing but 
addressing the question of whether something new may be taking place – [e]n écrivant ce 
livre, [j’ai] eu le sentiment de n’avoir pour destinaire que le Arrive-t-il? And the thinking 
of the event concerned for him, the ultimate resistance to the instrumental use of time – 
l’ultime résistance que l’événement peut opposer à l’usage comptable du temps.55 It is 
here that contemporary critical theory finds its most forceful impetus, that is, in a radical 
nonidentity thinking that no longer takes the relation between subject and object as its 
point of departure, but simply thinks in terms of an incommensurable emergence of new 
possibilities of political action and the aporetic regard for ways in which this emergence 
may be solicited without returning to the philosophy of the subject. It is exactly this 
impetus that one discerns in Negri’s concern with constituent power that refrains from 
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subject formations that are nothing but the continuation or repetition of already available 
histories. 
 
For an other, different, theorisation of the event one must turn to Alain Badiou, another of 
the Marxist theorists that emerged from Althusser’s circle.56 At one level at least, 
Badiou’s argument contests Negri’s frontally. For Badiou the ‘reach’ into that which 
Negri assumes to be an underdetermined multiplicity is always and can only be directed 
by, and thus contained within, what he calls the situation, ‘contained’ as past memory, 
present options and future scope. And while structures are indeed re-embedded and 
renewed in time, the renewal proceeds along given pathways, and it is always the 
situation that shapes and delimits the ‘encounter’ with whatever may be outside it, 
establishing in the process the very meaning of encounter, of what is situated and against 
what it is situated, establishing, that is, reference to self and other.  Against dialectical 
thinking, for Badiou, for the engaged - situated - subject there is nothing beyond the 
situation. 
 Thus Badiou’s account of the ‘situation’, to begin with, presents us with closure 
that is totalising.  In terms of semiosis, for Badiou the closure of situations is condition of 
signification, of the creation of meaning, of something counting-as x.  And that is why 
resistance is caught up in a double bind here because while negation would be crucially a 
presupposition of breaking out of the confinement of a situation, yet it plays a functional 
role within the situation. The problem for critique here is that, as a value in the dyad of 
exclusive alternatives, negation confirms the situation as much as affirmation does. 
Normative orders at this point exploit negation as a means of immunising themselves 
from challenge. Negating the situation by operating within its own semiotic universe, 
thus forever slips back into affirming it, not transcending it. 
And yet, for all the totalising hold of the situation, Badiou attaches the possibility 
of critique, and therefore of resistance, to the idea of the event. The event cannot be 
inferred from the situation. ‘As something that cannot be recognized as one in the 
situation, an event is the presentation of inconsistency in the situation.’57 ‘From within 
the situation the existence of the event cannot be proved, it can only be asserted. An event 
is something that can only be said to exist in so far as it somehow inspires subjects to 
wager on its existence.’58 What does it mean to ‘assert’ what is denied presence?  
We do not for present purposes need to follow Badiou in the critical-theorisation 
of how the new breaks into the ‘situation’ as an ‘event’. Suffice it so say that for him the 
event remains ‘unpresented and unpresentable’ and its belonging to a situation is 
undecidable from within the situation itself.59 Instead the appearance of the event follows 
a certain logic of rupture, an emergence that could not be counted-for from within the 
situation, and an opportunity that arises paradoxically in spite of the opportunity-structure 
available. 
 
                                               
56 Though in Badiou’s case, the relationship with his teacher was fraught, to say the least.  For a 
fascinating account of the tensions see Dominique Lecourt, The mediocracy: French philosophy 
since the mid-1970s (2002). 
57 Peter Hallward, Badiou: A Subject to Truth (2003), 115 ff. See also Peter Hallward, ‘Order and 
Event’, (2008) 53 New Left Review, 97-122 ff. 
58 Alain Badiou, Being and Event (1988); transl. Oliver Feltham (2008), 214 ff. 
59 Badiou (n. 58) (2008) 199 ff. et 202 ff. 
 
IV 
Conclusion   
 
The critical concern with the event and the emergence of radical utopian possibilities of 
action that is at stake in the contemplation of constituent power (in terms of itself, and not 
in terms of something else) is irreconcilable with the critical concern with the normative 
framework of the state and the whole gamut of constituted power implied by this 
normative framework. It is nevertheless the task of critical theory not to neglect either of 
these possibilities of critique. The critical project on which, for instance, Neumann 
embarked unfolded squarely within the parameters of existing conceptions of constituted 
power. Its critical thrust, however, is not in the least blunted today in a time that 
executive judiciaries are again (or still) the secret agents of the emaciation of the state 
and the reduction of the normative framework of Modernity to the logic of the market. 
This critical project, however, must remain accompanied by the thinking of unheard 
possibilities of political action, were it not ultimately to collapse into a complacent 
endorsement of the compromised justice that known forms of political organisation offer. 
It is for this reason that critical theory must continue to think, with Negri, the aporetic 
thought of a constituent power that can only be understood in terms of itself and not at all 
in terms of constituted power. Caught between these two irreconcilable and opposite 
trajectories, critical theory faces the difficult and awkward task of constantly articulating 
and rearticulating its own in/coherence. 
 
Let us finish by reiterating some of the fundamentals of Critical Theory as captured 
variously by our thinkers, and with special emphasis on the critique of juridical reason 
and its critical deployment.  
The first thing to note is that critique begins in the context of the articulation of 
specific constellations of meaning, where the creation of meaning occurs in terms of 
specific imaginaries, with their vocabularies and rules of signification, It also occurs in 
the context of specific sets of social relations, institutional arrangements and processes of 
social reproduction. In both senses it is always in media res 
In the second place, critique involves the acquisition of distance from the 
conceptual forms that determine identity and action, where by ‘distance’ one need not yet 
assume a fully fledged reflexivity but at least the introduction of contingency where there 
is necessity. This is both key to critical thinking and one of its steepest requirements, one 
that Althusser for one, as we saw, thought impossible in relation to the fundamentals of 
capitalist relations. Marx’s analysis of the fetish phenomenon is, as we saw, a case in 
point: for Marx too the commodification of social relations is ab initio and cannot be 
stepped behind to recover them in a non-alienated form. Where founding assumptions 
carry a certain self-evidence into the imaginary constitution of society, as inscribed in 
language and as mobilising specific systems of signification and material support, critical 
theory demands the recognition of the contingency of those foundations. 
The reflexive move is emphatically not a stepping outside of the context that 
might afford an objective (as opposed to class-inflected) view but always carries the 
partiality of contextually situated and historically conditioned perspectives. 
And yet the critical perspective is one that fastens onto contradiction, a term under 
which we can here subsume also fundamental inconsistencies, silences and exclusions, 
discrepancies between what the system promises and what it is capable of delivering. 
Capable is an important word here; unlike ‘likely’ it carries a structural limitation. For 
example a capitalist labour market cannot deliver on the promise of full employment 
because a market - in order that it be able to optimise supply and demand - requires a 
structural element of unemployment to maintain itself as a market. In this respect critique 
distinguishes itself from criticism as simply directed to rectify inconsistencies. In 
contrast, the object of critique is to expose contradiction and offers neither rectification 
nor reconciliation. 
Where contradictions have been tracked, ideology critique aims to expose them as 
the systematic expression of dominant interests – whether these are class interests or 
whether they pertain to gender, race or underlie other forms of oppression. Ideology 
critique approximates the critique of domination most clearly when these particular 
interests combine in hegemonic constellations.   
